kirmani v captain cook cruises

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The plaintiff, Kirmani, was injured on a cruise in Sydney Harbour, and subsequently brought a personal injury claim for damages against the shipowner, Captain Cook Cruises Pty Ltd (CCC). It was established that CCC's ship, the Captain Cook II , was not a sea-going vessel and thus the LLMC 1957 did not apply. CCC alleged that its liability was limited to 15 pounds sterling per ton of the ship, as per Part VIII of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (UK) (MS Act), s 503. In answer, Kirmani argued that s 104(3) of the Navigation Amendment Act 1979 (Cth) (NA Act) repealed that law in Australia. The question then arose whether the NA Act had repealed the UK legislation to the extent it applied to a cruise taking place wholly within Sydney Harbour, and, if it intended to do so, whether that intention was invalid or otherwise.

Held, per Mason, Murphy, Brennan, and Deane JJ (Gibbs CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ dissenting) : s 104(3) of the NA Act validly repealed Part VIII of the MS Act, and para 4 of the defendant's notice of grounds of defence (relying on the supremacy of the MS Act) should be struck out.

Gibbs CJ (dissenting): Section 333 of the NA Act provides that all provisions of the LLMC 1957, save art 1.1.c, have the force of law in Australia, while s 334 provides that certain ships not being sea-going ships can still be treated as such for the purposes of the amending legislation and the applicable provisions of the LLMC 1957. As of 1980, s 334 applied to most vessels as though they were sea-going vessels, with limited exceptions for pleasure craft, inland waterways vessels, and the like. Article 8 of the LLMC 1957 allows Contracting States to determine what classes of ship they will treat as sea-going ships when applying the Convention.

Section 103 of the NA Act describes the MS Act and provides that this Imperial legislation is, as amended or affected by any other Imperial Act or Act, part of the law of the Commonwealth. However, s 104(3) states that Part VIII of the MS Act is repealed. The issue then arises how to reconcile these sections in relation to the present case, and whether Part VIII of the MS Act was repealed insofar as it was part of the law of NSW. Gibbs CJ was of the view that the expression 'the law of the Commonwealth' from s 103 referred to the law of the Australian nation, but not the law dealing with matters within the Commonwealth's legislative powers. In essence, ss 103 and 104 were performing the same function as s 2(2) of the Statute of Westminster 1931 (Imp) (the Statute) which allowed Imperial Dominions to repeal or amend UK laws to the extent that a law of the Dominion addressed the same matters and the UK law was redundant. Section 2(2) did not apply to state legislation or legislatures. The Statute superseded the previous Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (Imp) which rendered colonial laws invalid to the extent they clashed with UK laws extending to the Colony. Section 9(1) of the Statute clarifies that it does not allow the Commonwealth of Australia to make laws in the domain of the States, outside of the Commonwealth's authority. Ultimately the Statute strengthened the powers of the Dominions, but for those Dominions which were also federations, a balance was reached between State powers and Commonwealth powers.

This made it necessary to discern whether Part VIII of the MS Act, in particular s 503 (about limited liability in personal injury cases), dealt with matters in the hands of the States, and whether these matters could nonetheless be within the authority of the Commonwealth. Section 509 of the MS Act states that it applies to the entirety of 'Her Majesty's Dominions', which Gibbs CJ interpreted as incorporating ships used intrastate, such as the Captain Cook II . Applying this to the present case, the Captain Cook II 's liability was a matter under NSW jurisdiction. Because the Statute of Westminster did not extend to the States, but only to the Commonwealth, NSW laws concerning limited liability for ships would still be invalid if they contradicted an Act of the UK Parliament extending to NSW (in this case, the MS Act s 503).

In the alternative, was repealing s 503 a matter for the Commonwealth, in its application to ships on the internal waters of the States? The external affairs power was not in question, because the Commonwealth was not implementing the LLMC 1957 when it legislated on matters outside of the treaty (in the NA Act, with regard to ships that were not sea-going ships). Nor was a Commonwealth Act which repealed a UK Act (to the extent it applied in Australia) a matter with respect to the external affairs power. When enacted, moreover, the MS Act became part of the law of NSW and other colonies, meaning it could not be 'external' to Australia, even if the law's source was external. Section 104(3) of the NA Act is not concerned with the relationship between the UK and Australia, but rather intends to repeal part of an Act that had become law in NSW, thus dealing with issues specific to Australia and not the UK.

Gibbs CJ concluded that s 104 of the NA Act was invalid to the extent that it intended to repeal s 503 of the MS Act, as part of NSW's law governing personal injuries aboard vessels (which are not sea-going vessels) in its internal waters.

Mason J: His Honour reiterated that when s 2(2) of the Statute refers to 'part of the law of the Dominion', what it means is the law in force within that Dominion. It eliminates prior restrictions on the legislative powers of Dominions through the doctrine of repugnancy, and allows Dominions to repeal or amend Imperial Statutes that apply to them. This power does not allow the Commonwealth Parliament to repeal or amend an Imperial Statute which is in the legislative domain of the State (s 9(1) of the Statute). However, if repealing Part VIII of the MS Act could be brought under the external affairs power, then it would be unnecessary to decide whether a State could repeal it.

Because of Australia's long-lasting and special relationship with the UK as a prior Dominion, and the ongoing application of various Imperial Statutes in Australia at the time, of their own force, Mason J considered the repeal or amendment of a UK Statute to be an element in Australia's relationship with the UK. This made the repeal of the MS Act an act pursuant to the external affairs power. The operation of a foreign law, being Part VIII of the MS Act, was an intrusion into Australian domestic affairs and supported the exercise of the external affairs power. At the time the MS Act was part of the law in force in Australia. It would be a matter of external affairs if Australia opened negotiations with the UK to have an Imperial law repealed, and the same if the Commonwealth Parliament is initiating the repeal, bringing a longstanding foreign law to an end by use of the external affairs power. This allows the Commonwealth Parliament to repeal an Imperial Statute even if the law's subject matter would otherwise be the States' concern and in their legislative domain.

Section 103 of the NA Act refers to the provisions of the MS Act insofar as it is part of the law in force in Australia, and the NA Act repeals Part VIII pursuant to the external affairs power.

Murphy J: His Honour agreed with the overall conclusion reached by Mason J and found that ss 103 and 104(3) of the NA Act were valid.

Wilson J (dissenting): Division 1 of the new Part VIII that the NA Act inserted into the Navigation Act 1912 (Cth) applied only to sea-going ships. This was because it was implementing the LLMC 1957, which is limited in that way. The Act provided, in s 332(3), that the Division did not apply to intrastate vessels to the extent that a State or Territory made provision giving effect to the LLMC 1957 in relation to such vessels. It would be possible for the Commonwealth Parliament to implement the LLMC 1957 in such a way that it repealed Part VIII of the MS Act, to the extent it applied to sea-going intrastate vessels. If the Captain Cook II was a sea-going ship, therefore, CCC's defence based on the MS Act should be struck out. Wilson J desired to have the case remitted to the NSW District Court to decide on this particular point (the status of the vessel).

Wilson J also considered s 2(2) of the Statute, and the manner in which it removed the shackles from Dominion Parliaments, allowing them to repeal or amend UK legislation that was inapplicable or redundant, disavowed the repugnancy doctrine, and specifically separated the rights of the Australian states from Commonwealth powers (through 'safeguards' in ss 7, 8, and 9).

Section 9(1) of the Statute prima facie prevents the Commonwealth Parliament from legislating in respect of matters within the States' authority, which would extend to intrastate shipping if this was deemed a State matter (and the external affairs power did not apply). Legislation with respect to intrastate shipping that did not go to sea was a matter within state control, not Commonwealth control, satisfying s 9. Repealing the MS Act insofar as it applied to NSW was a State matter, thus the Commonwealth legislation purporting to do this on NSW's behalf was invalid.

Was the Commonwealth nevertheless validly legislating pursuant to the external affairs power? Ratifying the LLMC 1957 brought an external affair into being with regard to which it could legislate. However, that external affair encompasses the limitation of liability for sea-going ships. It was incidental to the implementation of the LLMC 1957 that the Commonwealth sought to repeal Part VIII of the MS Act. The subject matter in both is the same. However, the power to implement the LLMC 1957 did not consist of the power to repeal Part VIII with respect to all shipping in Australia, including intrastate shipping that was not sea-going. The small class of intrastate non-seagoing vessels that exist may be legislated for by the States. If the NA Act's repeal did apply to such shipping, it would have the effect of removing an existing protection without substituting anything else. The external affairs power was not in issue because the repeal would be a law with respect to the law of an Australian State, not a foreign State or country.

Wilson J concluded that s 104(3) of the NA Act was valid, but it exceeded the Commonwealth's legislative power if it purported to repeal MS Act Part VIII throughout the States. 

Brennan J: The phrase 'part of the law of the Dominion' in s 2(2) of the Statute includes in its scope any Imperial laws in force in any part of that Dominion, as well as any other law, from whatever source, in force at the time. The grant of the power under s 2(2) to repeal or amend an Imperial law was intended to assist in resolving conflicts between UK Parliament and the government of a Dominion once the Colonial Laws Validity Act ceased to apply. Section 2(2) of the Statute did not invalidate inconsistent Imperial laws extending to the Dominion - it merely allowed Dominions to override them.

Brennan J interpreted s 2 of the Statute as both removing fetters from Dominion Parliaments in terms of what powers they could exercise, and also providing a new power to repeal and amend Imperial laws specifically. This power is also affected by s 9 of the Statute, which prohibits the Commonwealth Parliament from enacting laws on matters in the domain of the States, and not being a matter within the Commonwealth's authority. For the Commonwealth Parliament's power under s 2 of the Statute to be confined, it must fit both of these 'criteria' from s 9. The power is unfettered so long as the law is on a matter within either exclusive Commonwealth jurisdiction or in concurrent jurisdiction with the State in question.

Because the Statute specifically excluded the Australian States from its operation, they remained limited by the Colonial Laws Validity Act, meaning they could not make laws repugnant to a law of the Imperial Parliament, extending to that State expressly or by necessary intendment. The law would be rendered invalid to the extent of the inconsistency. However, if the Commonwealth Parliament amends an Imperial law (relying on a head of power under s 51 of the Constitution) extending to an Australian State and thereby expresses its own legislative intention as against the Imperial Parliament's, the Colonial Laws Validity Act has no operation. The effect is the same as if the Imperial law applying to the State was repealed. The State may then enact a law repugnant to the Imperial law that previously applied and was amended, provided the subject matter is within the State's purview.

Brennan J also considered the effects of ss 735 and 736 of the MS Act. Section 735 allows the legislature of a British possession (including the Australian States) conditional authority to repeal parts of the MS Act that relate to ships registered in that possession. This would include Part VIII, concerning the limitation of liability. Section 736 grants the legislature of a British possession the power to regulate coastal trade. Confirmation from Her Majesty in Council is also required by s 735, limiting the power of the States to rely on the section. When the Commonwealth Parliament enacted s 104(3) of the NA Act, the matter it legislated with regard to was not within NSW's authority. Because of this, the NA Act was created by the Commonwealth government within the power bestowed by s 2 of the Statute, and the application of the external affairs power was irrelevant.

Deane J: His Honour rejected the argument that the reference to 'law of the Dominion' in s 2(2) of the Statute referred only to laws in force in the federal jurisdiction. Rather it incorporates the various kinds of internal laws that exist simultaneously in the States. The Statute was created following two Imperial Conferences in 1926 and 1930, during which 'Australia' was represented as one entity possessing consistent interests, as a singular member of the international community. At the Conference, unitary nations and federations were treated alike. This all leads to the conclusion that the ultimate expression 'law of the Dominion' in the Statute refers to Australia as a whole. Although ss 8 and 9 and their distinction between federal and state legislatures in Australia exist, they nonetheless rely on an express division not used in s 2, cementing the idea that s 2 has an indiscriminate application.

Because of this, and other related reasons, the relevant provisions of the NA Act should be interpreted as repealing Part VIII of the MS Act, insofar as those provisions constituted part of the law at federal and state level. The repeal is within the Commonwealth's legislative power and competence because, first of all, s 2(2) contains a new legislative power, not just the removal of pre-existing fetters. This is suggested, for example, by the phrasing 'the powers of the Parliament of a Dominion shall include', before going on to identify a legislative power to repeal and amend redundant Imperial laws. Further, the notion that s 2(2) bestows an independent legislative power is supported by the Privy Council's decision in Moore v Attorney-General for the Irish Free State . In that case, it was implicitly accepted that the Statute conferred on the Irish Parliament a 'new power'. That power was adjusted for the Australian context in ss 8 and 9 of the Statute, confining the new power in such a way that it excluded matters falling within the exclusive authority of the States.

Deane J, however, concluded that it was irrelevant whether ss 103 and 104(3) of the NA Act covered matters within the authority of the States for the purposes of s 9(1). More importantly, this law fell within the Commonwealth's legislative powers regarding external affairs. This power is usually invoked when giving effect to an international treaty, but this was not the only way in which it can be used. It also applies generally to laws affecting or concerning Australia's relations with other countries, including the UK.

In this case, the NA Act was a law with respect to a matter concerning external affairs, because provisions of a UK law were being precluded from operating in Australia. The law necessarily involved Australia's relations with the UK. The UK law in question was also not part of the 'inherited' law, but was instead a Statute of the UK Parliament applying in Australia by force of its operation as a UK Act, because the UK Parliament had decreed it should operate in Australia.

Dawson J (dissenting): Section 2 of the Statute gives no indication that it intended to extend the powers of the Dominions it affected. It merely removed pre-existing shackles on that legislative power. It speaks to the doctrine of repugnancy and the need to recognise the greater independence and legislative competence of the Dominions. It strengthens existing powers rather than adding onto them. It would be inconsistent with the purpose of s 2(2) of the Statute to grant Dominion Parliaments legislative powers beyond their own Constitutions. In that event a Dominion could theoretically repeal an Imperial law without the capacity to create a law of its own to fill the gap. Section 9 of the Statute preserves existing constitutional practice in Australia by separating the competencies and authority of state and federal parliaments, and reading s 2(2) as bestowing greater power to the Commonwealth parliament would contradict ss 8 and 9's intentions. Dawson J also argued that a closer reading of Moore indicated that the Judicial Committee did not give any real consideration to the idea that s 2(2) provides an independent, additional source of legislative power.

The NA Act's attempt to repeal Part VIII of the MS Act had as its subject matter the liability of shipowners. Section 735 of the MS Act authorises State legislatures to repeal provisions of the MS Act to the extent it applies to ships registered in that State. Although ss 735 and 736 alike require Royal assent, this does not detract from the fact they grant authority to the states, not the federal Parliament.

Dawson J dismissed the argument that the NA Act was a valid law with respect to the external affairs power, as s 103 of the NA Act and the phrase 'part of the law of the Commonwealth' did not extend to the States. The MS Act still formed part of the law of the States. The MS Act was only repealed insofar as it applied as part of the law of the Commonwealth. This reading of s 103 was the same as of s 2(2) of the Statute (involving the phrase 'part of the law of the Dominions').

Section 503 of the MS Act (concerning limitation of liability) also did not preclude the implementation of the LLMC 1957. Section 65 of the NA Act inserted a new Part VIII into the legislation, implementing the LLMC 1957 and giving it the force of law in Australia. Even without the express repeal of Part VIII of the MS Act through ss 103 and 104(3), the provisions of the MS Act inconsistent with the LLMC 1957 would have been impliedly repealed because of s 65 of the NA Act. When s 104(3) sought to repeal Part VIII of the MS Act, it was going beyond the boundaries of the LLMC 1957, and could no longer rely on the external affairs power regardless. The external affairs power cannot support a repeal of Part VIII of the MS Act beyond matters which the LLMC 1957 governs. The LLMC 1957 only applies to sea-going ships, and s 503 of the MS Act applies also to vessels that are not sea-going ships. As the Captain Cook II is not a sea-going ship, this creates a dilemma whereby the LLMC 1957 does not apply but the MS Act does.

Having disposed of the external affairs argument, Dawson J also asserted that the repeal of an Imperial law was not a matter concerning external affairs, because the supremacy of the Imperial parliament remained a crucial aspect of constitutional theory and practice, and the continuing existence of an Imperial law was not an intrusion into domestic affairs. Both the Constitution and the Statute derived their authority from the Imperial Parliament and were crucial parts of Australia's legal identity. The continuing existence of Imperial legislation was not a matter of external affairs in the same way as Australia's relations with the UK would be. If anything, the subject matter of the repealing provisions in the NA Act was the liability of shipowners, the same as the provisions it was repealing, which did not concern external affairs.

For all these reasons, s 104(3) of the NA Act was not adequate to repeal Part VIII of the MS Act.

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Kirmani v captain cook cruises pty ltd (no 1) [1985] hca 8.

ON 27 FEBRUARY 1985, the High Court of Australia delivered Kirmani v Captain Cook Cruises Pty Ltd (No 1 ) [1985] HCA 8; (1985) 159 CLR 351 (27 February 1985).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1985/8.html

Sydney, Australia

1300 00 2088

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Peter O'Grady Lawyer

1985 | Kirmani v Captain Cook Cruises Pty Ltd (No 1)

ON THIS day in 1985, the High Court of Australia delivered Kirmani v Captain Cook Cruises Pty Ltd (No 1 ) [1985] HCA 8; (1985) 159 CLR 351 (27 February 1985).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1985/8.html

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Constitutional Principles and Coherence in Statutory Interpretation

La Trobe Law School Symposium on the coherence of statutory interpretation

RTF version 207 kb

This broad topic was given to me by Professor Keyzer and may I say, at once, that it is not only imposing but also, potentially, ambiguous. I say that with good reason. As frequent interpreters of Commonwealth legislation, Federal Court judges as a caste, have an eye keenly attuned to the detection of ambiguity. [1] The topic could, for example, be asking what effect constitutional principle has upon the coherence of statutes as interpreted or, perhaps more tantalizingly, [2] it could be referring to the impact of constitutional principle upon the field of law known as statutory interpretation. The former topic makes, I think, for a short meal. The law about coherence in the actual interpretation of statutes is clear. We have it on the authority of Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority [3] ( 'Project Blue Sky' ) that a statute is to be construed on the prima facie basis that its provisions are intended to give effect to harmonious goals so that where the language in which it is expressed gives rise to conflict, the meaning of the conflicting provisions is to be 'adjusted'. [4] What kind of adjustment is required? One that will best give effect to the purpose and language of the provisions whilst 'maintaining the unity of all the statutory provisions'. In pursuit of this lofty principle, the High Court counsels us to give meaning to every word of the provision so as to avoid, so far as is possible, superfluity in the language in which the statute has been cast. Later in this speech I am going to return to this principle which, in a practical sense, is perhaps the most significant principle in statutory interpretation. [5]

So interpreted, a discussion of the topic suggested by Professor Keyzer might, quite possibly, stop right here with not much more to say than has just been said. Whilst this might be a mercy to the listener, and certainly for the speaker, this is not, I apprehend, what was intended. I propose, therefore, to focus upon the second interpretation of the topic and to take a brief sojourn through the field of statutory interpretation itself, to ponder its coherence as a topic of legal discourse and then to assess the impact of constitutional principle upon that coherence.

Some immediate difficulties arise which stand in our way. What do we mean by coherence? What is a statutory interpretation and how might it be coherent? And, what are constitutional principles? It will be obvious that none of these questions is small. Largely fortuitously, it seems best to answer them in the order just posed.

A few words about coherence

As a matter of ordinary contemplation, coherence denotes a state of affairs free from inconsistency or perhaps to put it another way, a state of affairs which is logically structured and does not suffer from internal contradiction. Of course, those who have studied logic either as an aspect of philosophy or of pure mathematics [6] will readily tell you that there is no link between truth and coherence. Perfectly logical arguments can be quite without content because logic is concerned with the validity of inferences drawn from premises and not with their truth or usefulness. An excellent example, which I owe to the late Dr John Bacon of the University of Sydney, is that of Skippy and the Helicopter. The following argument is logical:

Skippy is a crocodile. All crocodiles are helicopters. Ergo , Skippy is a helicopter.

Whilst logical the argument is also absurd; indeed, it may be doubted that it has any content at all beyond its formal validity.

Many people in the law believe that formal validity – 'logic' or 'coherence' if you will – is a worthwhile goal. I am not sure, however, that all those who invoke coherence as an informing legal value necessarily have themselves the most complete grasp on the distinction between valid reasoning (with which logic and coherence are solely concerned) and arguments that are correct or right (which may or may not also be logical or coherent). For example, the fact that an argument which is illogical leads to a particular outcome does not mean that the outcome is itself incorrect or false. I may reason illogically that because all cats are animals and because Felix is an animal that Felix is a cat. But my argument's lack of logic tells one nothing about whether Felix actually is a cat; in particular, the fact that my reasoning is illogical does not establish that my conclusion is wrong and that Felix is not a cat. Erroneous reasoning of that kind has a name: it is the fallacy fallacy or for those who like Latin, the argumentum ad logicam . The fallacy fallacy has, I fear, become endemic within the legal profession, the academy and the judiciary. [7] It is very common in legal discourse to claim the contrary view is illogical and hence wrong but, as I hope I have just explained, that last step is itself illogical.

This is not necessarily a cri de coeur on my part that we should all begin to reason irrationally; rather, it is just to sound a note of caution about the limits to which coherence as an informing concept in shaping principles of justice may be put.

I am by no means the first person to blow on this trumpet. Much more famously it was Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr who observed that '[t]he life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience'. [8] That famous statement has often enough been called upon by judges seeking to resist logical arguments which, if acceded to, would lead to results regarded as unpalatable. For example, many people have thought that in personal injury cases the head of damages known as Griffith v Kirkemeyer [9] damages are illogical. This head of loss allows a badly injured plaintiff to recover from a defendant the commercial cost of voluntary services provided to her. The overarching position in negligence is, of course, that a plaintiff can only recover loss suffered by them [10] but, on one view, Griffith v Kirkemeyer damages appear to be an example of the plaintiff recovering for loss actually suffered by someone else, namely, the carer. In CSR v Eddy (2005) 80 ALJR 59 at [91] McHugh J explicitly invoked Holmes' dictum to justify the anomalous position of this head of damages. Indeed, according to his Honour, ' Griffith v Kirkemeyer illustrates the truth of Holmes' dictum'. McHugh J is not alone. In another area of tort law, that concerned with the difficult question of whether psychiatric injury should be regarded as different to personal injury, Spigelman CJ invoked Holmes to say that '[i]n this field, the law manifests the classic aphorism of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jnr'. [11] Indeed, he went somewhat further by unearthing [12] a statement by Fullager J of which I must confess I was quite ignorant until I prepared this paper. We are, according to Fullager J, to resist:

'….the temptation, which is so apt to assail us, to import a meretricious symmetry into the law.' [13]

'Meretricious' is a pretty harsh word. It derives from the Latin word meretrix , which means prostitute. 'Meretricious' has come to mean the quality of being apparently attractive but of having no real value. I think maybe Fullager J went a little too far in this; indeed, I doubt he was intending to suggest that judges should give up reasoning logically altogether. It was more, I think, a reminder that we should not be blinded entirely by formality.

That is a proposition which, so it seems to me, is acceptable. Without some form of commitment to logical reasoning there is a systemic risk that cases that are essentially or relevantly identical will be decided differently. Whilst there is a good deal of debate about the nature of justice there is a degree of support for the idea that it includes, at least, the notion that similar cases should be decided the same way. And that principle is, in substance, no more and no less than the principle of equality before the law. That is why the High Court has always turned its face against 'palm tree justice', [14] that is to say, cases where a court simply decides a case entirely by how it personally feels the case should be decided. How the propinquity of the judge to a palm tree is apt to encourage this style of reasoning has always eluded me. [15]

Consistently with this view of the issue, there are many statements of the highest authority urging judges towards coherence. Miller v Miller [16] concerned the question of whether the drunk driver of a stolen car owed the drunk passenger who had stolen the car a duty of care such that losing control of the vehicle and crashing into a pole was actionable in negligence. Breach of duty was admitted; the only issue was whether the duty existed. Of central concern was the interaction between tort law and the unlawful conduct of the plaintiff. At [15]-[16] six justices said:

  'These reasons will show that the central policy consideration at stake is the coherence of the law. The importance of that consideration has been remarked on in decisions of this Court. Its importance in this particular context was emphasised by the Supreme Court of Canada. It is a consideration that is important at two levels. First, the principles applied in relation to the tort of negligence must be congruent with those applied in other areas of the civil law (most notably contract and trusts). Second, and more fundamentally, the issue that is presented by observing that a plaintiff was acting illegally when injured as a result of the defendant's negligence is whether there is some relevant intersection between the law that made the plaintiff's conduct unlawful and the legal principles that determine whether the plaintiff should have a cause of action for negligence against the defendant. Ultimately, the question is: would it be incongruous for the law to proscribe the plaintiff's conduct and yet allow recovery in negligence for damage suffered in the course, or as a result, of that unlawful conduct? Other questions, such as whether denial of liability will deter wrongdoers or advantage some at the expense of others, are neither helpful nor relevant. And likewise, resort to notions of moral outrage or judicial indignation serves only to mask the proper identification of what is said to produce the response and why the response could be warranted.'

I have omitted the footnotes to this passage but the second sentence is accompanied by footnote 8 which contains a number of authorities all emphasizing the important of coherence as a legal value. They are: Sullivan v Moody [17] ('More fundamentally, however, these cases present a question about coherence of the law'); Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner [18] ('the need for coherence of legal principle and the effects of overly broad interpretations of waiver and estoppel upon other doctrines must be borne in mind'); and, CAL No 14 Pty Ltd v Motor Accidents Insurance Board [19]  ('Another difficulty obscured by the narrow formulation of the duty of care in the light of the particular eventuality which came to pass is that of legal incoherence'). Other more recent cases also emphasise the importance of coherence as a legal value. [20] Perhaps these are all best summarized by the observation of Lord Devlin in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [21] that 'no system of law can be workable if it has not got logic at the root of it'.

There is then an obvious tension between the Lord Devlin's view about the root need for logic in a legal system and Holmes' observation about the life of the law not being logic but experience. The High Court is not itself unaware of this tension. It was explicitly referred to by five justices in Collector of Customs v Agfa Gavaert [22] and both McHugh J and Gleeson CJ have separately discussed the tension between the two positions. [23]

One has the position then that the law's approach to the value of coherence as a legal principle is itself not altogether coherent. It seems that the prevailing value is logic but that perhaps, to borrow the words of Branson J in a different context, it is at best to be seen as a 'counsel of perfection'. [24]

Statutory Interpretation and Coherence

There is no particular skill involved in locating coherence issues in general legal discourse. This is because most areas of law are made up of rules calling for obedience by the subject or application by the judges. A coherence issue will arise in such a system wherever two rules in it conflict. This can happen internally where two principles in the same field of law appear to contradict each other. It can happen externally where disparate fields of law are brought into contact and require apparently conflicting outcomes. A very straightforward example of an internal conflict might be afforded in constitutional law by a State law which conflicts with a paramount federal statute. In such a case, the resolution is provided by s 109 of the Constitution . An example of an external conflict might arise from the imposition of a duty of care upon state officials in the exercise of some statutory power (perhaps the power to decide to fill a pot hole in a road) and the refusal of administrative law to have a Court review such a decision on its merits. The former tort rule requires a Court to decide whether the official's actions were reasonable; the latter forbids any such consideration by a court because it would infringe upon the separation of powers. My present point is only that every legal system is riddled with such conflicts and it is the everyday task of courts, especially intermediate appellate courts, to sort them out.

But consider the law of statutory interpretation. Although there are rules of law in statutory interpretation, much of this field of law is not made up of rules of law at all but rather by non-binding principles of interpretation. There are long lists of these principles in the textbooks. To cite just six well-known ones:

• in interpreting a provision of an Act, the interpretation that would best achieve the purpose or object of the Act is to be preferred to each other interpretation; [25]
• the meaning of a word is to be derived from its context. [26] Thus, in the expression 'house, office, room or place' the word 'place' does not include a public lane. Consequently, a person accused of betting in a public laneway should not have been convicted of betting in 'a place'; [27]
• general matters are constrained by reference to specific matters. [28] Thus 'a railway, road, pipeline or other facility' does not include a storage facility; [29]
• express reference to one matter excludes reference to another matter; [30]
• a statute is to be construed on the prima facie basis that its provisions are intended to give effect to harmonious goals; [31] and
• constructions involving superfluity should be avoided. [32]

None of these principles requires any particular outcome. Furthermore, there is no set of principles which tell one what to do when more than one principle of statutory interpretation might apply and generate dissonance. There is no rule, like s 109, that tells one that the ejusdem generis rule prevails over the exclusio alterius rule. At best, there is an informal and somewhat hazy understanding in some quarters that some rules are more or less important – perhaps fashionable – than others. Thus, at the moment, we are told that the exclusio alterius rule is 'a valuable servant, but a dangerous master'. [33] So too, most judges would recognize that the principle of harmonious construction advocated in Project Blue Sky is somehow a more cardinal principle than many others. Why some principles are in vogue and others not must remain always something of a mystery.

The present point is that these principles do not, and cannot, really conflict because none of them actually requires any particular outcome. Once that is appreciated it may appear that statutory interpretation is, for the most part, quite unlike other fields of law in that many of its principles are not really rules of law but rather merely available approaches to resolving ambiguity.

For myself, I think that observation tends to decrease the utility of asking whether statutory interpretation, as a field, is coherent. The coherence inquiry presumes the presence of rules which have a sufficiently hard edge that they can be seen to be inconsistent with one another. There are, to my mind, serious difficulties in asking whether, for example, as a matter of general principle the approach in Project Blue Sky is consistent with s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 . The question just does not really make much sense.

Coherence more generally

Nevertheless, we may yet be able to identify a coherence issue if we can locate principles of statutory interpretation which transcend the ordinary kinds of rules enumerated above and which apply more generally. I think that this can be done, but it necessitates a certain Cartesian skepticism to pare the topic back to its essentials so that its underpinnings are exposed. This requires one to ask what it is that a court is doing when it interprets a statute. In putting my emphasis on what courts do, I am not seeking to ignore that there are many other persons and entities which use statutes besides courts (a point sometimes made by Parliamentary Counsel to judges who complain about legislative drafting styles). However, the role of the courts in interpretation is unique because theirs is the interpretation which is authoritative and binding on everyone else. How other people might read legislation, whilst a legitimate concern for those involved in drafting, seems to me to have little relevance to the constitutional function which courts discharge when doing so themselves.

What then is happening when a court interprets the written text which is a statute? One matter is clear: what is involved is a speech act by the legislature and a listening act by the courts. What are the features of such a situation? There are a number of matters worth pointing out. First , largely this is not a dialogue. The principal role of the legislature is to speak and that of the courts to interpret. With limited exceptions, there has not historically been much of an indication that what is taking place between courts and legislatures is a dialogue in which both parties are, in some sense, participating. That observation is contrary to some more recent statements to which I am going to return concerning the principle of legality. But before it burst on to the scene, there was only limited evidence for such a dialogue. There might be a dialogue in which the legislature is the listener to the extent, I suppose, that Parliamentary Counsel draft legislation with full knowledge of the interpretative rules which the Courts are going to apply. In that sense, the form of legislation will often, although not inevitably, be drafted in a way which is not tone deaf to the way the courts are likely to read it. But this is a fairly emaciated form of dialogue. So too, the courts are in some circumstances inclined to treat various legislative actions as endorsing prior judicial determinations. [34] Whether this is a true dialogue or rather an assumption on the judiciary's part that it has been listened to may be a different question.

But these kinds of matter are quite limited examples of dialogue. Even assuming there is a dialogue in relation to the principle of legality (a proposition which, on empirical grounds, I venture to doubt below), even its most doctrinaire adherents would not argue that there is a more general dialogue between courts and legislatures about the meaning of legislation outside the context of fundamental rights.

So that is the first feature: we are concerned with a speech act which either is a monologue or, at best, a very limited form of dialogue. The role of principal listener and interpreter rests with the courts.

Secondly , we are concerned with a very particular kind of speech act. It is at the extreme end of formality. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine more formal English than that used in a statute. The law is not in slang. It contains no jokes. It is not read for fun or even for betterment. It is the formal embodiment of the outcome of the community's political processes. Further, not only is it highly formal but it is also the product of legislative chambers which are deliberative in nature and which consist of many persons. These are important matters. In every human language the listener derives considerable insight into what the speaker is saying by the context in which it is being said. Reflection on ordinary speech shows this to be so. The English we read and write is a different dialect to the English we speak, a fact to which we are so inured that we tend not to notice it. Written English is generally expected to make sense and be grammatically correct. Its sentences are orderly. This very paragraph may, hopefully, serve as an example of this dialect. On the other hand, the spoken English which we carry on between us, every day, is quite different. Its chaotic sentences are usually not finished. Verbs are left hanging. The speakers cut across each other; fragments of sentences lie scattered all about. The meaning of this mish-mash emerges not from the grammar of what is being said (which barely exists at all) but most often by the listener instinctively understanding what the speaker is attempting to say. This happens even in the comparatively formal setting of a courtroom. Here is some transcript of oral submissions recently made to me by reputable senior counsel:

But even if they were concerned about that risk, the fact that both people have significant risks does not promise in any way what the answer will approximate what the tribunal would do, for the very reason of what you can only say about it, which Mr Thorpe agreed, there was a substantial risk that would be substantially different. So if you've got a deal which is premised on that an assessment by a tribunal of the real value could be substantially different in each direction from that which is achieved, and that's the premise upon – that's the analysis, it seems somewhat strange, with respect, to then say, "That's the value."

I was not struck by the thought at the time that the submission made to me was gibberish, but that is what it appears to be on the page, robbed of its surrounding context of body language and any general understanding at the time of what was being talked about. This is not an isolated phenomenon. If you listen carefully to almost any conversation between humans you will discover that, grammatically, it very rarely makes any sense at all. Here is a transcript of an ordinary conversation retrieved from google.com:

'Note: (.) indicates a short pause SALLY: so how's your new job going  JOHN: well (.) you know (.) all right  SALLY: what you doing then  JOHN: this week I've just been on the phones  SALLY: what (.) selling  JOHN: no they're doing like a survey (.) what people think of the the service and all that  SALLY: that's a bit off (.) so you've got to deal with all the moaning and complaining all the flak  JOHN: no (.) no it's just like a questionnaire were your goods delivered on time yes or no  SALLY: d'you think you'll stick it  JOHN: next week I'm with the regional manager out on the on the road (.) that'll be all right  SALLY: I was on the phones at the Town Hall (.) dead boring  JOHN: tell me about it  SALLY: so what's your mate doing  JOHN: who  SALLY: you know whatsisface (.) had the Mohican  JOHN: Gizmo  SALLY: yeh  JOHN: he's gone back to college  SALLY: weren't he dead good at computers (.) I thought he passed everything  JOHN: he got a good grade for computing but he's doing resits (.) he couldn't get in (.) where was it (.) I don't know (.) Manchester or somewhere'

It is interesting that spoken English is so very incoherent. Just as interesting is the fact that no-one appears to be troubled by this and understands perfectly well what is being said. If nothing else teaches this lesson, surely this phenomenon shows that context is not peripheral to understanding speech acts but dramatically central.

Experience bears this out. The sentence 'He fed her cat food' has two potential meanings. Only by knowing the context in which it was said (captive woman force-fed cat food versus kindly neighbour looking after cat) can we unravel it. Further, it is not just the context in which the speech act occurs that determines its meaning. It can also be the identity of the intended audience. Thus, when spoken, the sentence 'The koala eats shoots and leaves' has a different meaning for a room full of marsupial biologists than it has for a room full of comedians. [35]

So what does this mean for statutory interpretation? The high degree of formality and written nature of statutory language guarantee that its interpretation is to be approached in an equally formal way. The listener will assume that the words used have been carefully chosen and that the speaker means precisely what it is saying. This is quite contrary to spoken English and less formal versions of written English. If you want to see how true that is, try applying Project Blue Sky and the ejusdem generis rule to, depending on one's age, an episode of My Kitchen Rules or Gogglebox.

This assumption about the careful use of language allows a series of deductions to be made about meaning from the linguistic choices which have been made. The use of one word here and another different word there permits an inference to be drawn that a difference was intended; the use of general words in one place and particular ones in another carries with it a legitimately inferred connotation. Because the language is formal and considered, the listener is entitled to assume that a coherent meaning was intended. Professor Pearce calls interpretative assumptions of this kind 'intrinsic principles' of interpretation and that is, with respect, a useful label. Each of the intrinsic principles of statutory interpretation can, I think, be traced to an inference arising from the formality of the language. It may be that the waxing and waning which influences the various principles of interpretation reflects changes in understanding amongst modern English speakers about what can be inferred from formal language. The comparative decline of the exclusio alterius principle may, perhaps, be an example of this.

It remains to note one final feature of these intrinsic principles. It is that linguistic deductions of the present kind tend to lack what might be called an overtly ideological content. In a vacuum, one's personal beliefs about how society should be organised are unlikely to throw very much light on whether, at a high level of generality, particular words should exclude general ones. Of course, at the coal face where cases are actually decided, one may well find that one's enthusiasm for one principle of statutory interpretation over another is influenced in a particular case by one's worldview. A good example, controversial perhaps, is afforded by the High Court's decision in Kirmani v Captain Cook Cruises Pty Ltd (No. 2) (1985) 159 CLR 461. The antecedent case (No.1) had involved an interesting question of whether a particular Commonwealth statute had validly repealed part of an earlier Imperial statute. The unsuccessful party then sought leave to appeal to the Privy Council from the High Court. Such an application was expressly provided for by s 74 of the Constitution :

'No appeal shall be permitted to the Queen in Council from a decision of the High Court upon any question, howsoever arising, as to the limits inter se of the Constitutional powers of the Commonwealth and those of any State or States, or as to the limits inter se of the Constitutional powers of any two or more States, unless the High Court shall certify that the question is one which ought to be determined by her Majesty in Council.'

The words appearing after the word 'unless' might have been thought suitable for the application of the principle espoused in Project Blue Sky at 382 [71] that a court construing a provision 'must strive to give meaning to every word of the provision'. Of course, Project Blue Sky is only a statement about statutes whereas as s 74 is part of the Constitution . But given the nature of a written constitution and the rigours, in particular, of the amendment requirements in s 128 it seems even less likely that a court of interpretation could simply ignore words which are not to its taste.

Not so, it seems. In a terse, but unanimous judgment, the Court rejected the application for a certificate (at 465):

'Although the jurisdiction to grant a certificate stands in the Constitution, such limited purpose as it had has long since been spent. The march of events and the legislative changes that have been effected – to say nothing of national sentiment – have made the jurisdiction obsolete. Indeed an exercise of the jurisdiction now would involve this Court in passing the responsibility for final decision to the Privy Council in that class of constitutional case which the Constitution marked out above all others as the class of case which should be reserved for the final decision of this Court – and this at a time when, as a result of the legislative changes already referred to, no other constitutional cases can be taken to the Privy Council.'

The present point is not to suggest that that conclusion is wrong but rather merely to illustrate that intrinsic principles of interpretation having little ideological content may nevertheless be utilised (or, in this case, not utilised) in ways which are connected to larger domains of discourse. The basic point remains sound nevertheless. The intrinsic principles of interpretation which may be inferred as corollaries of the formal nature of statutory language do not have an ideological edge to them, however they might be applied in practice. Nor, for completeness, can they be seen as saying much about legislative intent save that the legislature intended to express itself carefully.

But these intrinsic rules are not the only principles which apply. We are additionally commanded by s 15AA to prefer an interpretation of a statute which is more consistent with the legislature's purpose. Much ink has been spilled on the nature of legislative intent both as a concept and as a tool. You will forgive me if I do not rehearse the issues which are usually thought to arise. My point is that, subject to a significant qualification, s 15AA does not require, and the Courts have not generally approached, the ascertainment of legislative purpose with any preconceptions about what kind of legislator the legislature is thought to be. In fact, all that s 15AA tells us to do is to read the statute consistently with the perceived purpose of the legislation giving us no particular preconceptions about what those purposes might be. In that sense, it presents as politically agnostic. This apparent political indifference finds itself reflected, perhaps embodied, in the High Court's modern position of insisting on the primacy of legislative text. A well-known instance of that posture may be found in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 250 CLR 503 at 519 [39]:

'"This Court has stated on many occasions that the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the [statutory] text " . So must the task of statutory construction end. The statutory text must be considered in its context. That context includes legislative history and extrinsic materials. Understanding context has utility if, and in so far as, it assists in fixing the meaning of the statutory text. Legislative history and extrinsic materials cannot displace the meaning of the statutory text. Nor is their examination an end in itself.'

(footnotes omitted)

This is apt to suggest that one should not approach the language of a provision with any a priori notions of what it might have been intended to mean; the language alone is to be paramount, the words supreme. This noble vision is certainly consistent with what the High Court has on other occasions said. For example, in Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations v Gribbles Radiology Pty Ltd (2005) 222 CLR 194 the Court said this (at [21]):

'Section 149 must be read in a way that gives effect, so far as possible, to its legislative purpose. Plainly, the purpose of the section and its predecessor succession provisions is, and always has been, to extend the operation of awards beyond those who were parties to the dispute that the award determined. But identifying that purpose does not answer the question that arises in this matter – how far does the extension go? It is only if some a priori assumption is made about the intended reach of the provision that considering its purpose casts light on the question. To reason in that way begs the question. Rather, it is necessary to consider the words of the provision. It is there that the intended reach of the legislation is to be discerned.'

Here then, I think, there is apparent consistency and coherence. The intrinsic principles of statutory interpretation are, so viewed, a blank slate without political content and this, itself, is reflected in the purposive approach to interpretation which tells one to focus only on the purposes of the legislature. Under both views, the judiciary leaves its political luggage at the interpretive door. I will come back to this judicial luggage shortly to make the point that political luggage, unlike real luggage, can be surprisingly difficult to lose.

What then about constitutional principles?

Constitutional Principles

This is a large sounding heading but may I, at once, trim it down? In the context of a discussion about statutory construction it is trite to say that Courts will endeavour to interpret statutory material consistently with the requirements of the Constitution . Section 15A of the Acts Interpretation Act requires as much as well as authorising reading down to facilitate it. No doubt, even without s 15A it would be necessary to read statutes subject to the Constitution . I do not think that this primacy of the Constitution over statute law tells one very much about the coherence of statutory interpretation. In a sense, it is a domain of discourse which lies outside, or at least beyond, statutory interpretation.

Rather more useful in the present context are a set of interpretative principles applied by Courts which might be called 'small-c' constitutional principles. By 'small-c', what I intend is that they are principles relating to, or touching upon, systemic elements of government or, to put it another way, that relate to the organisation, or literally, the constitution of government. Many of these will be familiar to you. They include:

• the presumption in Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277 that legislation is not to be interpreted as altering common law doctrines without expressing that intention with 'irresistible clearness';
• the presumption that legislation is not to be interpreted as having an extra-territorial effect: Jambunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Mines Association (1908) 6 CLR 309 at 363;
• the presumption that legislation does not interfere with vested proprietary interests: Clissold v Perry (1904) 1 CLR 363 at 373; and
• the presumption that legislation is not to curtail certain human rights and freedoms (including personal liberty) unless an intention to do so is clearly manifested in unambiguous language – the principle of legality : see, e.g., Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562 at [19] per Gleeson CJ.

There are many others. They are usefully collected in Chapter 5 of Pearce and Geddes (supra) . Now an interesting question to ask is from where do these derive? I have tried to argue above that the intrinsic rules of interpretation are, in effect, colourless implications flowing from the formal nature of the language used and the very context of a deliberative legislature pronouncing rules of law. That other extrinsic tool of interpretation – legislative purpose –is likewise said to be focussed on the purposes of the legislature and does not permit the taking into account of a priori notions of what a statute might mean, leastwise judicial a priori notions.

Until the recent efforts of those behind the principle of legality to identify its legitimacy as deriving from a shared dialogue between legislature and courts, there had not been very much of an attempt to explain why these various constitutional assumptions were made. Looking at the traditional ones I identify above it is possible, I think, to discern an assumed set of values accepted, I think its authors would have thought, by everyone at the time the presumptions were first fashioned.

The presumption that legislation is not to be interpreted as abolishing common law doctrines without expressing itself with irresistible clarity is, so it seems to me, a direct invitation not to read legislation in accordance with its ordinary language. In such a context, ordinary words will not do; only the very clear will suffice. But in the interpretation of ordinary statutory language we are content to contend with ambiguity. Indeed, we have a complete armoury of tools – the intrinsic aids to interpretation – which allow us to make sense of the ambiguous.

The effect of this presumption (and the others to which I have referred) is to make unavailable all of the intrinsic aids for resolving ambiguity. Where the abolition of a common law doctrine is concerned, any ambiguity means that the common law doctrine is not affected even if the ordinary intrinsic rules of interpretation would have resulted in the opposite outcome.

This seems, arguably, to involve the a priori assumption that common law doctrines are something which should be preserved, if possible, from the blandishments of a legislature. What value does this represent? And whose value is it? A cynic might answer this by observing that the judiciary's tenderness to protect the common law reflects a certain chauvinism for judge made law. The presumption has its origins well before the twentieth century so we should, perhaps, not be too judgmental. For modern eyes, it is easy to identify historic common law doctrines which seem shocking and not in any way worthy of protection from a legislature. For example, it is the common law which gave us both the principle that a wife could not be raped by her husband [36] and trial by combat. [37] Why do we need words of unmistakeable clarity to get rid of these achievements of the common law?

Other presumptions may be seen to rest on similarly shaky foundations. The presumption that legislation does not have an extra-territorial effect is a close cousin of the principle that legislation is to be construed on the assumption that it does not breach principles of international law. Both assumptions proceed on a premise that, in some ways, it is desirable for municipal law to operate harmoniously with international law, whether customary or public. But modern events cannot leave one with any confidence that this is a shared value at all. Australia often legislates extra-territorially. The examples are not obscure or difficult to find. Extra-territorial operation lies at the heart of the extended application provisions in s 5 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) . The laws prohibiting whaling inside Australia's exclusive economic zone but outside its territorial waters are another example. [38] Further, Australia is not shy about assertions in the international sphere which are, or may be, legally dubious. One example may be Australia's claim to large swathes of the Antarctic which is contested by many States. [39]

I suppose it might be said that the Commonwealth is, of course, free to break international law if it wants but the judiciary proposes to proceed on the basis that it does not so intend. However, that is likely only to involve a restatement of the problem. Even so expressed, the presumption contains an a priori notion that the international legal order is something worthwhile. Whilst that is an idea which is attractive to many including myself, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it is an opinion lying outside any given legislative text.

A similar point may be made about each of the other items on the list set out above and I hope I will be forgiven for passing over them. It would, however, be remiss, and incomplete, not to mention the principle of legality. With the two assumptions I have just dealt with it might be accurate, although perhaps a little glib, to say that they reflect a certain lawyerly view of how the world ought be arranged. But that world view is not explicitly articulated anywhere. By contrast, in the case of the modern acceptance of the principle of legality there is, for the first time, an explicit statement of the values involved. In a well-known passage, Gleeson CJ explained in Electrolux Home Products v Australia Workers Union (2004) 221 CLR 309 at 329 [21]:

'The joint judgment in Coco went on to identify as the rationale for the presumption against modification or abrogation of fundamental rights an assumption that it is highly improbable that Parliament would "overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general system of law" without expressing its intention with "irresistible clearness". In R v Home Secretary; Ex parte Pierson, Lord Steyn described the presumption as an aspect of the principle of legality which governs the relations between Parliament, the executive and the courts. The presumption is not merely a common sense guide to what a Parliament in a liberal democracy is likely to have intended; it is a working hypothesis, the existence of which is known both to Parliament and the courts, upon which statutory language will be interpreted. The hypothesis is an aspect of the rule of law.' (Footnotes omitted)

This brings out into the open what appears to be a set of a priori values which are to influence how the intention of Parliament is discerned from the text it uses. In short, they are the values of a modern liberal democracy. The wielding of such a set of values by the judiciary would, in a vacuum, be undemocratic for it is not the role of the Courts to impose the values of the members of the bench on legislation. This democratic deficit is apparently, however, overcome in the case of the principle of legality because the values are not those of the Courts alone but are instead a 'working hypothesis the existence of which is known both to Parliament and the courts'.

While I have no particular difficulty endorsing those values myself, I must say I am sceptical of the claim that they constitute a working hypothesis known to both branches of government. If that claim meant only that Parliament (by its Parliamentary Counsel) is aware of the manner in which Courts will interpret legislation and it is that knowledge which constitutes the working hypothesis then it would, whilst probably true, also be fairly trivial. Certainly, I am reasonably sure that the proponents of the principle did not only have in mind the bland concept that Parliament knows how the Courts are going to interpret its legislation.

It is much more likely that the principle includes not only the idea that the values thus encapsulated are good or worthwhile but also the notion that they are shared by both the Parliament and the Courts. It is, so it seems, a hypothesis upon which both branches are working together. If that were not so, the difficulty of the democratic deficit implicit in judges imposing an a priori set of values onto legislation would be acute. It is only this conception of shared values which can avoid that difficulty or (on the trivial interpretation) save the principle from a meaning which would otherwise be trite.

I doubt whether the principle of legality thus understood is empirically sound. It would be nice to believe that Parliament shares a commitment to the values which inhere in a modern liberal democracy, but in practice this does not appear to be the case. It seems to me therefore arguably inaccurate to ascribe to Parliament a shared set of liberal democratic values. As the current turmoil in the Western world shows, liberal democratic values are by no means immutable or even shared.

If that be so, then the principle of legality hangs by a thin conceptual thread. It looks like a set of a priori notions being applied to legislation by the judicial branch. That is to say, it appears to be an example of an approach to legislative interpretation which otherwise the authorities tell us is to be avoided at all costs. When we find ourselves in an area over which the principle of legality holds sway, the words on the page are not to be read by reference to their usual meaning. They are instead to be read as if they did not intend to interfere with a posited set of values unless the language is unavoidably plain. If one rejects the shared values premise upon which the principle rests – and there are good factual reasons to think it dubious – then this seems to me to open up the law of statutory interpretation to a charge that the principle of legality reduces its coherence particularly on the role of a priori notions. One might make useful comparison with this irregular verb: ' I am applying a shared liberal democratic value ', ' You are resorting to an a priori matter ', 'She is a judicial activist' . As I explained at the outset, however, whether that is a bad thing is altogether a different question well beyond the scope of this paper.

[1] I have borrowed the sentiment in this phrase from the Full Federal Court's judgment in Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises (1993) 43 FCR 280 at 287 which counsels judges in judicial review actions against the folly of construing the reasons of an administrative decision maker too finely 'with an eye keenly attuned the detection of error.'

[2] I do not by this mean necessarily to suggest that the search for coherence in statutory interpretation resembles the sorry lot of Tantalus, doomed by the gods to an eternity of temptation without satisfaction.

[3] (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [70]-[71] per McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ.

[4] This is the High Court's word. Perhaps, with respect, a better word might have been 'interpreted'.

[5] By significant I mean often applied. The advice in Project Blue Sky to interpret the statutes in a coherent way is very practical advice for judges and hence very widely applied. It is certainly the authority most often handed up by counsel during argument. Over the years, I have collected very many photocopies of this important case as a result of the diligent efforts of counsel to bring it to my attention. I am, of course, grateful.

[6] Noting that logicians contend that pure mathematics is a branch of their field of study and not the other way a around: see Bertrand Russell's grand assertion in Principles of Mathematics Vol 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1903) p.3: 'Pure mathematics is the class of all propositions of the form " p implies q " where p and q are propositions containing one or more variables, the same in the two propositions, and neither p nor q contains any constants except logical constants.'

[7] Part of the rich legacy of the legal profession's unjustifiable disdain for matters scientific and/or mathematical.

[8] Holmes O W Jr, The Common Law (Little, Brown and Company, 1881) p 1.

[9] (1977) 139 CLR 161.

[10] English lacks, or has lacked until recently, a genderless (as opposed to neuter) third person singular pronoun. 'They' has in recent years come to be used for this purpose. It not only sounds correct but fills a genuine lacuna in the language exposed by the need to avoid the clumsy he/she acrobatics by which the elegance of early 21 st Century prose is marred.

[11] Morgan v Tame [2000] NSWCA 121 at [3].

[12] At [4]; maybe 'disinterring' would be a better word.

[13] Attorney-General (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1951-1952) 85 CLR 237 at 285.

[14] The root of the antipathy to palm tree justice begins in R v Watson; ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248 at 257 per Barwick CJ, Gibbs, Stephen and Mason JJ; speaking of property settlement proceedings before the Family Court their Honours observed that 'The judge called upon to decide proceedings of that kind is not entitled to do what has been described as "palm tree justice"'.

[15] The palm tree has a long and distinguished career in symbolism in both the East and the West perhaps only seriously rivalled by the olive. Jesus is said triumphantly to have entered Jerusalem to crowds waving palms and it is recorded that Mohammed himself delivered sermons apparently leaning against a palm tree. It is unclear to me whether 'palm tree justice' relates to this kind of date palm or perhaps instead to the coconut palm, popular in Pacific Islands and under which it is apparently very pleasing to sit (and, perhaps in moments of quiet contemplation, dispense arbitrary justice).

[16] [2011] HCA 9.

[17] (2001) 207 CLR 562 at 576 [55].

[18] (2008) 238 CLR 570 at 602 [100].

[19] (2009) 239 CLR 390 at 406-410 [39]-[42].

[20] See Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners-Strata Plan No 61288 (2014) 254 CLR 185 at 702 per French J and 213-214, 239 per Crennan, Bell and Keane J; Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Hexton (2012) 246 CLR 498 at 514, 518 and 520 per French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ. See also Bent, E. 'Statute and Common Law: Interaction and Influence in Light of the Principle of Coherence' (2015) 38(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 367.

[21] [1964] AC 465 at 516.

[22] (1996) 186 CLR 389 at [402]

[23] CSR v Eddy ( 2005) 80 ALJR 59 at [96]; Scott v Davis (2000) 204 CLR 333 at [121].

[24] Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia (2015) 234 FCR 549 at 552 [7].

[25] A paraphrase of s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth).

[26] The so-called noscitur a sociis rule.

[27] See Prior v Sherwood (1906) 3 CLR 1054, an example proffered by Professors Pearce and Geddes in their very useful work Statutory Interpretation in Australia (8 th Ed., LexisNexis Butterworths) at p.171.

[28] The ejusdem generis rule.

[29] See Canwan Coals Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1974) 1 NSWLR 728.

[30] The expressio unius est exclusio alterius rule.

[31] Project Blue Sky.

[32] Project Blue Sky.

[33] Houssein v Under Secretary, Department of Industrial Relations and Technology (NSW) (1982) 148 CLR 88 at 94. The original quote concerns 'money' rather than the exclusio alterius rule. Gilles Ménage ascribed the original quote ('L'argent est un bon serviteur, meis un mechanént maitrè) to Francis Bacon: Menegiana, ii, 296. In modern times, the quote has also been applied, without obvious signs of success, to liquor.

[34] See, e.g., Ex parte Campbell (1870) LR 5 Ch App 703 at 706 per James LJ.

[35] When written the sentence is also a salutary lesson of the need to be careful with commas: cf Truss, L. Eats, Shoots and Leaves: The Zero Tolerance Approach to Punctuation (Profile Books, 2003)

[36] Sir Matthew Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown , Vol VI, (1736) ch 58 p 629; although note the discussion of this statement in PGA v The Queen (2012) 245 CLR 355 at 369 [18].

[37] Still alive and kicking in 1818: Ashford v Thornton (1818) 1 B&Ald 405; 106 EQ 149.

[38] See ss 225 and 229B of the Environmental and Bi9odiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth).

[39] See Australian Antarctic Territory Acceptance Act 1933 (Cth).

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Ch. 9 The Development of Russia

Ivan i and the rise of moscow, learning objective.

• Outline the key points that helped Moscow become so powerful and how Ivan I accomplished these major victories
• Moscow was considered a small trading outpost under the principality of Vladimir-Suzdal into the 13th century.
• Power struggles and constant raids under the Mongol Empire’s Golden Horde caused once powerful cities, such as Kiev, to struggle financially and culturally.
• Ivan I utilized the relative calm and safety of the northern city of Moscow to entice a larger population and wealth to move there.
• Alliances between Golden Horde leaders and Ivan I saved Moscow from many of the raids and destruction of other centers, like Tver.

A rival city to Moscow that eventually lost favor under the Golden Horde.

Grand Prince of Vladimir

The title given to the ruler of this northern province, where Moscow was situated.

The Rise of Moscow

Moscow was only a small trading outpost in the principality of Vladimir-Suzdal in Kievan Rus’ before the invasion of Mongol forces during the 13th century. However, due to the unstable environment of the Golden Horde, and the deft leadership of Ivan I at a critical time during the 13th century, Moscow became a safe haven of prosperity during his reign. It also became the new seat of power of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Ivan I (also known as Ivan Kalita) was born around 1288 to the Prince of Moscow, Daniil Aleksandrovich. He was born during a time of devastation and upheaval in Rus’. Kiev had been overtaken by the invading Mongol forces in 1240, and most of the Rus’ principalities had been absorbed into the Golden Horde of the Mongol Empire by the time Ivan was born. He ascended to the seat of Prince of Moscow after the death of his father, and then the death of his older brother Yury.

Ivan I. He was born around 1288 and died in either 1340 or 1341, still holding the title of Grand Prince of Vladimir.

Ivan I stepped into a role that had already been expanded by his predecessors. Both his older brother and his father had captured nearby lands, including Kolomna and Mozhaisk. Yury had also made a successful alliance with the Mongol leader Uzbeg Khan and married his sister, securing more power and advantages within the hierarchy of the Golden Horde.

Ivan I continued the family tradition and petitioned the leaders of the Golden Horde to gain the seat of Grand Prince of Vladimir. His other three rivals, all princes of Tver, had previously been granted the title in prior years. However they were all subsequently deprived of the title and all three aspiring princes also eventually ended up murdered. Ivan I, on the other hand, garnered the title from Khan Muhammad Ozbeg in 1328. This new title, which he kept until his death around 1340, meant he could collect taxes from the Russian lands as a ruling prince and position his tiny city as a major player in the Vladimir region.

Moscow’s Rise

During this time of upheaval, the tiny outpost of Moscow had multiple advantages that repositioned this town and set it up for future prosperity under Ivan I. Three major contributing factors helped Ivan I relocate power to this area:

• It was situated in between other major principalities on the east and west so it was often protected from the more devastating invasions.
• This relative safety, compared to Tver and Ryazan, for example, started to bring in tax-paying citizens who wanted a safe place to build a home and earn a livelihood.
• Finally, Moscow was set up perfectly along the trade route from Novgorod to the Volga River, giving it an economic advantage from the start.

Ivan I also spurred on the growth of Moscow by actively recruiting people to move to the region. In addition, he bought the freedom of people who had been captured by the extensive Mongol raids. These recruits further bolstered the population of Moscow. Finally, he focused his attention on establishing peace and routing out thieves and raiding parties in the region, making for a safe and calm metaphorical island in a storm of unsettled political and military upsets.

Kievan Rus’ 1220-1240. This map illustrates the power dynamics at play during the 13th century shortly before Ivan I was born. Sarai, the capital of the Golden Horde, sat to the southeast, while Moscow (not visible on this map) was tucked up in the northern forests of Vladimir-Suzdal.

Ivan I knew that the peace of his region depended upon keeping up an alliance with the Golden Horde, which he did faithfully. Moscow’s increased wealth during this era also allowed him to loan money to neighboring principalities. These regions then became indebted to Moscow, bolstering its political and financial position.

In addition, a few neighboring cities and villages were subsumed into Moscow during the 1320s and 1330s, including Uglich, Belozero, and Galich. These shifts slowly transformed the tiny trading outpost into a bustling city center in the northern forests of what was once Kievan Rus’.

Russian Orthodox Church and The Center of Moscow

Ivan I committed some of Moscow’s new wealth to building a splendid city center and creating an iconic religious setting. He built stone churches in the center of Moscow with his newly gained wealth. Ivan I also tempted one of the most important religious leaders in Rus’, the Orthodox Metropolitan Peter, to the city of Moscow. Before the rule of the Golden Horde the original Russian Orthodox Church was based in Kiev. After years of devastation, Metropolitan Peter transferred the seat of power to Moscow where a new Renaissance of culture was blossoming. This perfectly timed transformation of Moscow coincided with the decades of devastation in Kiev, effectively transferring power to the north once again.

Peter of Moscow and scenes from his life as depicted in a 15th-century icon. This religious leader helped bring cultural power to Moscow by moving the seat of the Russian Orthodox Church there during Ivan I’s reign.

One of the most lasting accomplishments of Ivan I was to petition the Khan based in Sarai to designate his son, who would become Simeon the Proud, as the heir to the title of Grand Prince of Vladimir. This agreement a line of succession that meant the ruling head of Moscow would almost always hold power over the principality of Vladimir, ensuring Moscow held a powerful position for decades to come.

• Boundless World History. Authored by : Boundless. Located at : https://www.boundless.com/world-history/textbooks/boundless-world-history-textbook/ . License : CC BY-SA: Attribution-ShareAlike

Shooter Files by f.d. walker

Street Photography Tips, Interaction, Travel, Guides

Apr 24 2017

City Street Guides by f.d. walker: A Street Photography Guide to Moscow, Russia

*A series of guides on shooting Street Photography in cities around the world. Find the best spots to shoot, things to capture, street walks, street tips, safety concerns, and more for cities around the world. I have personally researched, explored and shot Street Photography in every city that I create a guide for. So you can be ready to capture the streets as soon as you step outside with your camera!

At over 12 million people, Moscow is the largest city in Russia and second largest in Europe by population ( Istanbul is #1). An urban, cosmopolitan metropolis with more than enough glitz and glam to cater to the elite, but without losing its fair share of Soviet era roughness around the edges. It can be fast paced, brash, busy, and trendy like other big cities, but it has its blend of West meets Russia atmosphere and beauty that provides plenty of unique interest. The Red Square is as famous as it gets, but there’s so much more to this city, including the most beautiful subway system you’ve ever seen. It would take years to capture all of Moscow, but that means you have an endless amount of areas to discover.

So here’s a Street Photography guide so you can be ready to capture all that Moscow has to offer before you even arrive!

• Patriarch’s Pond
• Old Arbat Street
• Maroseyka Street
• Tverskoy Boulevard

Top 5 Street Spots:

1. red square.

The Red Square is the most famous square in not just Russia, but all of Eastern Europe. The name actually doesn’t come from the color of the bricks or communism, but from the name in Russian, Krásnaya, once meaning “beautiful” before its meaning changed to “red.” This large plaza is what you see on the cover of guide books and magazines for Moscow, with St. Basil’s Cathedral being the center piece next to Lenin’s Mausoleum surrounded by the Kremlin Wall. Of course, the Red Square attracts hordes of tourist due to the main attractions, but all that activity around an interesting atmosphere does provide street photo opportunities. It’s also the central square connecting to the city’s major streets, providing a good starting point to explore outward.

You’ll also find the popular pedestrian only Nikolskaya Street connecting the Red Square to Lubyanka Square. This line of expensive shops includes plenty of activity, while also leading you to another popular square. Filled with history rivaling any city, the Red Square and surrounding areas are the heart and soul of Russia.

2. Patriarch’s Ponds

Patriarch’s Ponds is one of the most exclusive neighborhoods in Moscow. Despite the name being plural, there’s only one large pond, but it’s worth a visit with your camera. It’s a popular spot for locals and expats to come relax or take a stroll around the pond. You get an interesting mix of young and old too, from young love to “babushkas” feeding pigeons. It’s a very peaceful park atmosphere in one of the nicer areas within the city center, while bringing enough activity for street photography. 

The pond is shallow and in the winter becomes a popular spot for ice-skating too. The area is also well-known for the location in the famous Russian novel, The Master and Margarita. 

3. Old Arbat (Stary Arbat)

Old Arbat is the most famous pedestrian street in Moscow, and dating back to the 15th century, also one of its oldest. Originally, it was an area of trade, but soon became the most prestigious residential area in Moscow. During the 18th century, Arbat started attracting the city’s scholars and artists, including Alexander Pushkin. Cafes lined the streets and impressive homes filled the neighborhood. Since then, New Arbat street was created as a highway in the area, while Old Arbat was paved for a 1km pedestrian only walkway.

Due to the historic buildings, famous artists that lived here, and the bohemian atmosphere, Old Arbat has become a big attraction for tourists today. Now, there’s a mix of cafes, restaurants, souvenir shops, street performers, street merchants and other attractions for visitors, and some locals, to come enjoy. It can get really busy here and there’s usually something interesting going on so it’s a good street to come walk with your camera for guaranteed life.

4. Gorky Park

One of the most famous places in Moscow is Gorky Park. The official name is Maxim Gorky’s Central Park of Culture & Leisure, which gives you an idea of what goes on here. When built, it was the first of its kind in the Soviet Union. Divided into two parts, it stretches along Moscow River. One end contains fair rides, foods stands, tennis courts, a sports club, a lake for boat rides, and more. This end brings more active life due to its number of attractions, while the other end is more relaxed, where you’ll find gardens, trees, older buildings, and an outdoor amphitheater.

Gorky Park attracts mostly locals so it’s a good spot to capture the non-tourist side of Moscow life. Muscovites come here to escape the city and unwind in a picturesque setting. The park remains alive outside of the warmer months too, especially when the lake turns into the city’s largest outdoor skating rink. I’d recommend taking the metro out here to spend at least half a day exploring the massive park’s life with your camera.

5. Maroseyka Street

Maroseyka Street is a popular area not too far from the Red Square. The long, winding street turns into Pokrovka and is lined with restaurants, cafes, bars and places to stay. It’s actually where I like to stay when I’m in Moscow due to its location and solid street photography opportunities itself. You have Kitay-gorod station near and if you keep walking southwest, you’ll get to the Red Square. But if you walk northwest, as it changes to Pokrovka, you can find a long street of activity for photography with its own interesting atmosphere.

6. Tverskoy Boulevard

Tverskoy Boulevard is the oldest and longest boulevard in Moscow, beginning at the end of Nikitsky Boulevard, and finishing at Pushkin Square, a spot to come for activity itself. The boulevard is made up of two avenues, with pedestrian walkways in-between. You’ll find grass, shrubbery, trees, benches and more walking it’s almost kilometer length. Many people come here to enjoy some relaxation, walk their dog, or just to use it to walk wherever they’re going. Its center location also provides a nice place to walk with your camera near plenty of other spots you’ll want to check out anyway.

Sample Street Walk:

For a full day of Street Photography, covering some of the best spots, you can follow this sample street walk for Moscow:

• Start your morning walking around the Red Square (1), while exploring the surrounding area, including Nikolskaya Street
• Then walk northwest to Patriarch’s Ponds (2) and slowly walk the pond and surrounding area with your camera
• Next, walk east to the Pushkin Monument and stroll down Tverskoy Boulevard (6)
• Once Tverskoy Boulevard (6) ends, it will turn into Nikitsky Boulevard. Follow this down until you get to the start of Old Arbat Street (3), across from Arbatskaya station
• After you’re done walking down Old Arbat Street (3) for more street photography, spend some time checking out Moscow’s beautiful metro stations
• To finish off the day with more street photography, get off the metro near Red Square (1) again, Maroseyka Street (5) or wherever you’re staying for the night.

3 Things I’ll Remember about Shooting in Moscow:

1. museum metro.

The Moscow metro system was the first underground railway system in the Soviet Union and today includes 203 stations across 340km of routes. The elaborate system has some of the deepest stations in the world too, with escalators that seem to go on forever. None of this is what makes it so special, though. Many of its stations feel like stepping inside a museum, making it without a doubt the most interesting and beautiful metro system I’ve been in.

When built, Stalin wanted to make the metro stations “palaces for the people” with marble, chandeliers, and grand architecture. The best part is the variety of architecture and styles used, making many of the stations a completely different experience visually. You could easily spend a whole day traveling the stations and there are even tours available for people who wish to do just that. My advice, though, would be just to buy a ticket and hop on and off at different stations, while exploring different lines. The museum-like surrounding mixed with the crowds of characters can make for a great photography experience.

Since there are so many stations, here are some of my favorites to check out:

• Novoslobodskaya
• Mayakovskaya
• Elektrozavodskaya
• Komsomolskaya
• Ploschad Revolyutsii
• Dostoyevskaya
• Prospekt Mira

2. Moscow is Big

It’s no secret that Moscow is a big city, but it can feel even bigger with how spread out much of it is. This is especially true if you compare it to cities outside of Asia. If I compared it to cities in Europe, I’d probably say only Istanbul would warrant more time to really discover the depths of this city. Most only explore around the Red Square and surrounding area, but that is such a small part of the city. Although, that central area does give you plenty to see on its own.

Fortunately, I had a good friend living in the city to show me around, but it opened up my eyes even more to how much there is to discover in Moscow. It’s a big city with a variety of atmosphere that can take you from “east” to “west” and trendy to rugged depending on where you go. I’d imagine you’d have to live here a while to really know the city.

3. Cosmopolitan Mix of East meets West

Modern skyscrapers mixed with amazing architecture, a world-class metro system with museum-like beauty, trendy fashion and chic clubs, Moscow is a rich mix of Russian culture and history in a more western cosmopolitan package. There is a push to keep the Russian culture, while also pushing forward with a modern metropolis the whole world will envy. This comes with an impressive skyline, that continues to grow, and endless modernities, but with soviet nostalgia and atmosphere mixed in for good measure.

Mixed in with this grand western cosmopolitan atmosphere, is a strong national pride in Russia. This includes their famous leader, Vladimir Putin. Maybe no other place will you see a country’s leader more often. All over, from the pricey tourist shops to the underground walkway stalls, you’ll find goods with Putin’s likeness covering them. From t-shirts to magnets to Matryoshka dolls. There’s a strong national pride that can be seen around the city, which also extends to their leader. Moscow is many things. It’s East meets West, modernizations meets Soviet era, and a whole lot more.

What To Do For a Street Photography Break?:

Eat at a stolovaya.

Stolovayas are Russian cafeterias that became popular in the Soviet days. You grab a tray and walk down the line of freshly prepared local dishes, and select whatever you want from the chefs. They’re usually inexpensive and a much better value than restaurants, while giving you the opportunity to try from a wide selection of everyday Russian food. They’re also very tasty. I always include some borsch on my tray and go from there. The places themselves are all over Moscow and usually come with Soviet-era aesthetics to complete the experience.

Street Safety Score: 7

*As always, no place is completely safe! So when I talk about safety, I’m speaking in general comparison to other places. Always take precaution, be smart, observe your surroundings and trust your instincts anywhere you go!

Being the 2nd largest city in Europe with over 12 million people, you’re going to have your dangerous areas, but for the most part, it feels safe walking around. Russia is statistically higher in crime compared to most of Europe, but this generally doesn’t apply to tourists and visitors. Around the Red Square and surrounding city center, you should feel completely safe walking around. Pick pocketing can happen, but no more than other touristic places. I always explore Moscow freely without coming across too much to worry about. It’s a spread out city, though, so of course it matters where you are. Just use basic street smarts, know where you are and Moscow shouldn’t give you a problem. 

People’s Reaction Score: 7

Moscow is fast paced, big city life, which usually means people aren’t too concerned with you, or your camera. I don’t find people notice or pay much attention to me when I’m out taking photos in Moscow. For the most part, people just go about their day. You shouldn’t get too many looks or concern. But it can depend on the area you are in. The more you stick out, the more you might get noticed with suspicions. I’ve never had any problems in Moscow, or Russia, but just be careful who you’re taking a photo of if you get out of the city center. Other than that, it’s about average for reactions. 

Street Tips:

Learn the alphabet .

Much of Moscow, including the metro system, doesn’t use english. The Russian alphabet uses letters from the Cyrillic script, which if you aren’t familiar with it and don’t know the sounds, can be hard to decipher the words. This is most important for street names and metro stops when trying to get around. It can save confusion and make it easier getting around if you learn the basic alphabet. At the very least then, you can sound out the words to see which are similar in the english conversion, which can help matching them to maps. When out shooting street photography, getting around is as important as anything. So save yourself some time and frustration by learning the Russian Alphabet.

Use the metro

While Saint-Petersburg feels very walkable for a city its size, Moscow can feel very spread out, even for its bigger size. Outside of the Red Square area, you can have plenty of walking before getting anywhere very interesting, so you’ll need to take the metro a lot if you really want to explore the city. Maps are deceiving here too, it will always be further than it looks.

Another reason it’s less walkable than Saint-Petersburg is its completely different set-up. Moscow’s streets are mostly contstructed in rings with narrow, winding streets in-between. This is common with medieval city cities that used to be confined by walls, but you usually don’t have it in a city this massive. Saint-Petersburg has a more grid-like pattern that also uses the canals to help you know your way around. When it comes to navigating on foot in Moscow, it can be more difficult, so bring a map and take the metro when needed. It’s why Moscow’s metro carries more passengers per day than the London and Paris subways combined.

Explore other areas if you have time

Moscow is really big. While most people stay around the Red Square within the Boulevard Ring, there’s so much more to the city. I covered some other spots outside of this circle, but if you really want to see the city, you’ll need time. If you do have time, some other areas I’d check out first are Zamoskvarechye, along some of the south and western Moscow.

Inspiration:

For some more inspiration, you can look through the Street Photography of Moscow photographer Artem Zhitenev  and check out 33 of my photos taken in Moscow .

Conclusion:

Moscow’s name brings a certain mystique, but once you’re there it might bring a different atmosphere than you expect. It’s big and sprawling, but beautiful in many ways. It can feel like a European capital on a grand scale, but you can definitely find its Russian side in there.

The urban sprawl of Moscow can be intimidating, but give it enough time and you’ll be rewarded with plenty to discover. All with the world’s best metro system to take you around.

I hope this guide can help you start to experience some of what Moscow contains. So grab your camera and capture all that Moscow has to offer for Street Photography!

If you still have any questions about shooting in Moscow, feel free to comment below or email me!

(I want to make these guides as valuable as possible for all of you so add any ideas on improvements, including addition requests, in the comment section!)

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